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I. Introduction 
Does the number of siblings amongst whom we grow up matter to our 
later fortunes in life? Do children who are raised in large families 
undergo some "cost of siblings" in terms of fewer parental resources 
received during childhood and a resultant loss of income-earning potential 
1 as adults? And does such a process imply the perpetuation of poverty 
from one generation to the next among low-wage high-fertility groups? 
The following analysis adds to other evidence indicating there 
is some such cost of siblings, i.e. that on average children from large 
families receive less schooling, do less well on tests of intelligence, 
and using indicators such as height, weight and age at menarche, appear 
less well-nourished than children from small families, even controlling 
for socio-economic class. 2 But my purpose in this analysis is to go 
beyond the simple negative correlation now increasingly confirmed between 
family size and various measures of child welfare, to consideration of 
the underlying causes of that negative correlation. My objective is to 
illuminate more precisely what factors ultimately determine the persist-
ent and oegativeLy-related"aifferences across parents between numbers of children 
and allocation of resources to inv.estment in those children. 
Data used for the analysis are from a 1967-68 family budget study 
in the four major cities of Colombia; 3 they include information on expendi-
tures by the household on a wide variety of categories, as well as infor­
mation on income of each person in the household, age and educational 
attainment of the husband, wife and all children present, and ·the number 
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting 
of the Population Association of America, Atlanta, 1978. The author 
thanks the members of the Yale Labor and Population Workshop, especially 
Mark Rosenzweig and T. Paul Schultz for many useful comments; Philip 
Musgrove for his suggestions and help; and David Bruce for computer 
assistance. Financial support from the Ford-Rockefeller Foundation 
Population and Development Policy Research Program, and from the 
Battelle Memorial Institute Population and Development Policy Program, 
is gratefully acknowledged. 
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of wife's children-ever-born and children living. 
In the following discussion, "investment in children" will refer 
to current expenditures of parents' time and money on children which 
.are likely to contribute to the children's future earning power. The 
measures of parental investment in children used here are education­
related, including both current household expenditures on education, and 
the educational attainment of children present in the household relative 
to that of other children in their age-sex group. Education is a particu­
larly good commodity for ·analysis of this type, since it is clearly child­
specific, and market expenditures on it are much less affected by the pro­
blem of economies of scale than are expenditures on such commodities as 
clothing and housing. 
My analysis is based on a specific view of the household decision­
makinE process underlying the simple negative correlation between family 
size and investment per child. Consider that the negative correlation 
could result for three conceptually distinct reasons. First: large 
numbers of children impose additional burdens on parents, directly 
causing a reduction in the amount of resources they allocate to each 
child. This is the reasoning implicit in most standard analyses of 
.4
family budgets. The initial appeal of this explanation-that parents' time 
and money cannot be stretche<l proportionately to accommmodate a growing 
household--provides little insight into why parents, who as a group have 
access to the same intuition and can foresee the constraining effect of 
many children on per-child expenditures, differ in their apparent choices 
regarding number of children and per-child expenditures. 5 
Second, an explanation often raised in the literature on fertility 
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and its determinants: parents who wish to invest much of their time and 
money income in their children will restrict family size.
6 This is the 
first explanation turned on its head, and also to some extent begs the 
question as to why parents differ in their apparent desires regarding 
allocation of resources to children. 
Third: the possibility that the direction of causality between 
family size and child welfare is not unique, that for parents neither 
the decision (or lack thereof) regarding family size nor that regarding 
investment per child precedes the other. In this view,. the two sets of 
choices are interdependent and jointly determined by characteristics of 
the parents and of the economic and social environment in which they 
live. (Such a view does not preclude the possibility that parents neither 
"plan" consciously for number of children nor investment per child; the 
iS$ue in this case is what determines such joint nondecisions.) 
It is the third view which is the basis for the following analysis; 
it begins with the assumption that the behavior of parents regarding per­
child investment cannot be viewed as independent from their apparent 
choices regarding the number of children to have. The joint persistence 
of the contradictory explanations one and two, alternatively offered by 
different analysts depending on their initial set of interests (i.e. the 
causes of differences in child welfare, or the causes of fertility differ­
ences) in itself lends credence to the third which, since it subsumes and 
reconciles the first two, is theoretically more appealing. The findings 
reported in this paper are largely consistent with this third view of 
the underlying process. General conclusions include the following: 
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1. In the simple correlative sense (based on ordinary least squareb 
estimation) there is a clear "cost of siblings," which persists even con­
trolling for household income and other characteristics. The relationship 
of additional children to per-child investment is negative and nonlinear. 
Per-child investment declines monotonically as family size increases; 
but once the dependent variable is standardized for age, a particular 
and different pattern emerges: Up to three or four children, families 
maintain steady investment per child; with five and more children, invest­
ment per child is distinctly lower. 
2. Using a model in which number of children and investment per 
child are jointly determined (two-stage least squares estimation), we 
find that large family size has an important negative effect in the 
causal sense on per-child investment. In this sample, as much as a 30 
percent increase in the income of the head of household would be required 
to offset the negative effect of one additional child on a household's 
per-child educational expenditures. From a policy point of view, the 
implication is clear: reductions in fertility will increase parents' 
investments in children's education. This is true partly because parents 
who seek to invest more restrict their fertility; but it is also true 
that an increase in parents' educational investment per child would 
follow even from a decrease in family fertility brought about solely by 
lower contraceptive costs. 
3. This negative effect of fertility on investment in children 
could be interpreted as inevitably causing the perpetuation of poverty 
across generations among high-fertility groups, short of very substantial 
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increases in income for already-1.~ge families. Would such a conclusion 
be correct? Probably t;ta.t: though family size matters, the vicious cycle 
is not inevitable. The analysis suggests one way such a cycle can be 
interrupted, Although rural-urban migrants have larger families than 
otherwise comparable longterm urban residents (probably reflecting the 
different economic environment in which the originally-rural families 
made their fertility decisions; such families face different relative 
prices for children and inputs to children--an example is different avail­
ability of contraceptives), and apparently spent less on education of 
their children while in the rural area (children of comparable urban fami­
lies have higher educational attainment), their current educational spend­
ing is similar to that of long term urban residents. Current spending is 
apparently not so greatly influenced by the migrant families' 
prior economic and social envi,ronment. Thus there operates some kind 
of a catch-up mechanism; despite higher fertility, larger average fami­
lies, and lower average educational attainment of children (age and sex­
standardized), migrant families adopt the educational spending habits 
of their urban counterparts; they do not spend less per child than those 
of comparable income and education. 
Thus we know that certain economic conditions (associated in this 
case with a move to an urban area, but other routes to changing prices 
7 
are imaginable) cause a decline in fertility; from conclusion 2 above, 
we know this lower fertility has a direct positive effect on per-child 
educational investment. Furthermore, in the case of recent migrants, 
even given already-large family size, a change in economic environment 
shifts investment upward. This increased educational spending by migrant 
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parents will lowe.· their children's fertility in the next generation, 
since education of parents itself has an independent negative effect on 
fertility. Even a modest increase in investment for one generation will 
lead to decreases in the fertility of the next; and modest decreases in 
the fertility of current parents have an immediate effect on their chil-­
dren 's schooling. 
Section II of this paper is a short discussion of the model on which 
the analysis is based; in Section III empirical findings are presented 
and discussed. 
II. Analytical framework 
A link between family size and child welfare (or child quality) 
is built into a model of fertility proffered by Willis, as well as Becker 
and L~is, 
8 
in which the household is viewed as maximizing a utility 
flll'l.ction of the form: 
U .,. U(N, Q, Z) 
where N is the number of children, Q is their quality or the household 
investment in them, and Z represents the rate of consumption of all other 
commodities. N and Q enter as separate arguments in the utility function, 
but child services, C, is set equal to NQ, and it is C which is produced 
(along with Z) according to the linearly homogeneous production function: 
C.,. NO• f(t, x)
• C C 
where t and x are vectors of the total amount of time and goods parents 
C C 
devote to children during the parents' lifetime. 
The fact that in cross-section studies and over time, higher-income 
families tend to have fewer children is explained in two ways. First is 
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a price effect. The principal "cost" of children is an opportunity cost, 
the time parents and especially mothers devote to childbearing and child­
rearing. Higher-wage parents experience greater opportunity costs in 
rearing children.
9 This price effect apparently swamps any positive 
€ffect of income on the demand for children. 
Second is an explanation that bears more directly on the issue 
of child welfare and its relation to family size, namely the observation 
that parents may wish to substitute quality for quantity in the production 
(rearing) and consumption (enjoyment) of children, i.e .. with greater 
income parents may spend more time and monetary resources on fewer children 
as an alternative to having more children. A critical feature of the 
model is that even without any special assumption about the substitution 
between quantity and quality in the parents' utility function or in house­
hold production, it will be tiue that for a smaller number of children, 
the true shadow price parents face for quality in those children is lower; 
and that similarly for a greater number of children, the true shadow price 
of quality is higher. This follows because of the multiplicative relation­
ship between N and Qin the production of child services; parents cannot 
"produce" children without producing in them some degree of "quality," 
they produce "quality" without children.
10 (This, in fact, wouldnor can 
be true for any commodity with both a quality and quantity component.) 
The model not only explains the empirical finding that as wage 
income of households increases, parents have fewer children. It also 
implies that high-wage parents will invest more in each of the fewer 
given level of qualitychildren they have, if only because the price of a 
per child is lowered with fewer children. In addition, of course, higher­
wage parents may have higher quality goals for their children, but such 
shifts in taste for quality with increases in wage income are not actually 
nece~sary for the quality-quantity substitution effect predicted by the 
model to 9ccur. 
The interaction between quality and quantity also causes a downward 
bias in the observed income elasticities for both N and Q; the direct or 
true effect of an increase in money income is to increase demand for both 
N and Q, but those increases in N and Q cause their shadow prices to rise, 
offsetting the pure income effect and reducing the observed income effect. 
Some critical features of the model, relevant to the following 
empirical work, should be pointed out: 
1. The model is static. Family size and parental investment in 
children are the result of jointly-determined utility-maximizing deci­
sions of parents made presumably at the beginning of their childrearing 
years. As children arrive, parents cannot change or adjust plans based 
on new information regarding their taste for children; as children grow, 
parents cannot alter investment strategies based on the ability or 
willingness of their children to participate in the investment process. 
Further, parents are assumed to foresee perfectly their future stream 
of income. 
This aspect of the model is hardly meant to represent reality. 
However, as a framework for empirical work, a static model has the 
advantage of being consistent with the use of cross-section data. Use 
of a lifetime utility-maximizing model would require information from 
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households over a long period. This model permits use of a measure of 
cumulative fertility to the present (standardized by age of mother) and 
a measure of cumulative investment in children to the present (such as 
their educational attainment, also standardized for their age) or of 
current investment in education. 
There is a seven or eight year lag between the time when parents 
conceive a child and begin spending on that child's education. To the 
extent that expansion of educational facilities in Colombia was greater 
in the 1960s than parents having children in the 1950s might have expected, 
the negative effect of number of children on per-child investment would 
be attenuated, and we have a strong test of the principal hypothesis. 
In fact, the rate of increase in the proportions of children enrolled 
11
did accelerate in the mid-sixties. 
2. An assumption of the model is that there is no joint production 
nor are there economies of scale in producing, or raising, children. 
This is highly questionable where parents' time is concerned (few mothers 
increase time spent in child care proportionately as additional children 
are born), and even for purchased inputs to children such as clothing or 
housing. However, it is not unreasonable to assume there are few economies 
of scale in the purchase of schooling, which is the measure of investment 
used here. 
3. A simplifying but not necessary assumption is that parents pro­
duce for each child the same quality level, i.e. there are neither favor­
ites nor Cinderellas. Findings from this sample not reported in this 
paper indicate that there are systematic differences in parental investment 
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within families, represented by birth order. These findings, however, do 
not alter the conclusions which follow from the analysis in this paper, 
as long as size effects dominate birth-order effects sufficiently so that, 
for example~ even in cases where early children receive greater resources 
than middle children, they still receive less than they would have, on 
average, in the absence of other children.
12 Birth-order differences can 
be shown to be consistent with the quality-quantity model as long as 
13
parental time is a binding constraint within periods of childrearing. 
III. Empirical framework and results 
RE?sults below are based on households in which both husband and 
wife are present. Estimates of educational investment are further con­
fined either to households with at least one child between the ages of 
6 and 18 or households with at least one child between the ages of 6 
14
and· 22, between 1200 and 1500 households. Following a description of 
variables, results are presented and discussed in the following order: 
A. Ordinary least squares regressions in which the dependent variable 
is one of several measures of parental investment in child schooling, 
with number of children present in the household entered as an explana­
tory variable along with other household characteristics. 
B. Reduced-form estimates of regressions of parent characteristics 
on parental investment in children, and on the demand for children. 
C. Estimation by two-stage least squares of an investment equation, 
in which fertility is entered as an endogenous variable on the right­
hand side. 
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Description of variables 
Table 1 lists variables used in regressions, with means and standard 
deviations for the sample of households with at least one child aged 6 to 18. 
Several measures of parental investment in the schooling of children are 
used. The simplest is the total amount of spending reported on education 
(TOTED). Similar is the share of the household's total budget going to 
education (BUDSHED). A serious shortcoming of these variables as measures 
of parental investment is that educational costs parents face may differ 
ffY age and sex of children; declining expenditure with increasing family 
size could thus overestimate or underestimate the effect of siblings on 
per-child investment, depending on whether larger families tend to have 
more or fewer older children (assuming older children cost more to keep 
in school, which is generally the case in Colombia, where most primary 
schools are public, but most iecondary schools private and tuition-charg-
ing). 15 Household expenditures on education should thus be standardized 
for age and sex of children present. Moreover, for a measure of average 
costs by age and sex, household expenditures on education should be esti­
mated for enrolled children only, since dropout rates increase with age. 
Unfortunately, interviewees were not asked whether children were 
currently enrolled, but only what amount of school children had completed. 
I therefore compared age and educational attainment to designate children 
as currently enrolled or not. Predicted expenditures by age-sex category 
were then estimated as a function of a regression of household educational 
expenditures on children "enrolled." (Various age standards tried and 
sets of predicted expenditures are shown in the Appendix. By any of these 
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TABLE 1 
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics for samnle 
of households with at least one child aged 6 to 1B, N=14JJ 
Standard
Mean Deviation 
TOTED Total household spending on education(l968 pesos, 64.8 107.8 
quarterlv)
BUDSHED Share of household budget spent on education .05 .05 
SC Family score (relative to other households) .40 ~73 
using current expenditures on education 
EDI Family educational index (relative to other 1.05 .945 
households) using children's educational
attainment 
CHL Number of children of wife currently alive 4,77 J.05 
ARAT Fertility measure, based on chi-ldren-ever­ .59 .29 
born, standardized for the age-fecundity
relationship using a natural fertility
.schedule 
LYH Natural log of husband's income(1968 pesos, ·6.J .92 
quarterly) 7.2 4.6SCH Husband's number of years of schooling
completed 
sew Wife's number of years of schooling completed 6.J 4.2 
· MIGD Migrant durrany. Equals one if household .10 .Jl 
members arrived from anywhere in Colombia 
other than Bogota, Medellin, Cali or 
Barranquilla within the last 5 years 
YSBC Number of years household members have resided 7.5 1.7 
in current city. Equals 1 to 5, or 8 for 
more than 5 · 
BOOD Bogota dummy. Equals one if current city .29 .45 
of residence is Bogota 
CAW Cali dwmny .21 .41 
MEDD Medellin dwmny .25 .43 
AGW Age of wife J6.4 8·.4 
AGSW Age of wife-schooling of wife interaction term 208. 185. 
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~tandards, enro:lment probabilities decline monotonically from above 
90 percent at age 9 to about 35 percent at age 17. Since parameter 
estimates using four different resulting "scores" for each household 
do not differ markedly, only the results using one of the computed scores 
are reported.) The resulting predicted expenditure for each household, 
depending on the age and sex of its children, is then the denominator 
in the dependent variable: 
EXEDj = actual total expendituresj
SC = __...,_.._ 
j PREDJ nj 
,.. expenditur.ei 
i~l XS 
in which j denotes the household, i the children in the household, x the 
ages 6,7 ••• 18, ands male or female. Each household's score is thus 
the ratio of its actual educational expenditure on education to its pre­
dicted expenditure. This score is calculated only for families with at 
least one child between ages 6 and 18 and no older children at home; 
this is because older children might affect the numerator but are not 
taken into account in the denominator. The same procedure is then follow-
16 
ed for all families with children between ages 6 and 22. 
An alternative method of measuring a family's investment in education 
is to compare households according to their children's educational attain-
17ment alone, without consideration of actual direct money expenditures, 
using as the dependent variable an index of the household's educational 
achievement relative to others in the sample with children in the same 
. i 18 age-sex categor es. 
-14-
EDij ~j educationixsjR 
i=l educationi
XS 
In the denominator is the mean educational attainment of children in the 
sample, by age and sex (shown in Table 2), and in the numerator household 
j's children's attainment. The index may be overstated for families with 
children in younger age groups (some of whom will drop out) ;still in an 
ordinary least squares regression on this dependent variable in which 
mother's age was included, the coefficient on age was not statistically 
significant, and the coefficient was not negative, as we.might expect, 
but positive. On the one hand, the index understates the efforts of 
families whose children repeat years of school, and thus for their age 
have completed fewer years; children who start late also depress the 
index for their household. On the other hand, late starters and repeat­
could well reflect differences in preschool and during-school invest­ers 
ments by parents of time and other inputs. 
Differences in regression results for the two dependent variables 
indicate whether parents respond to the financial pressures of schooling 
primarily by removing children from school or primarily by spending less 
education of children while keeping them enrolled. The two variableson 
differ in another respect as well. The first measures current spending 
on education; the second reflects to some extent a whole series of past 
spending decisions, which have produced a certain level of educational 
attainment for children. Thus differences in them may also provide some 
insight into how patterns of investment change as the economic situation 




Mean Educational Attainment in Years of School 
Canpleted by Age and E>ex * 
Boys Girls~ 
6 .18 .25 
7 .60 .68 
8 l.20 l.2J 
9 1.78 1.74 
10 2.40 2.60 
11 J.16 J.J8 
12 4.02 4.32 
13 5.17 5.10 
14 5.87 6.01 
15 6."74 7.18 
16 . 7.53 7.94 
17 7.71 8.01 
18 8.08 9.61 
*
The sample includes-more than 100 persons in each 
age-sex cate~ory. 
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Two different measures of fertility are also used. In a standard 
budget analysis, the number of children currently being supported might 
be viewed as best C?pturing the constraint on educational spending children 
may present. However, from a lifetime planning point of view, children 
currently living at home is not the correct variable. On the one hand, older 
children who have left the household could be contributing to household 
income and thus influencing current expenditures on education of children 
still at home positively. On the other hand, they could affect negatively 
household expenditures on education of children still present, if they 
contributed to an earlier depletion of resources allocated by parents 
for children's education. Moreover, the age at which children leave 
home itself depends on parental investments in their education, and is 
thus endogenous. For these reasons, a measure of completed family size 
is -preferable. Two are used. One is children currently alive; it is 
assumed to represent the best measure of household's desired number of 
children, as well as the best indicator of number of children. in terms 
of the effect of family size on investments in children, assuming mortality 
does not vary systematically across households. Both these assumptions 
are based on the premise that most children who die do so in infancy, so 
that parents can replace them if they wish,
19 and so that their existence 
does not affect strongly investment-per-child. (Ideally children-ever­
born would be used, and an additional equation representing child mortality 
would be entered into the structural system; however this would make the 
identification problem discussed below even more serious.) 
The second measure of fertility, ARAT (age ratio), is standardized 
-17-
for mother's age using a natural fertility schedule. 
20 Its principal 
effect is to purge the fertility variable of differences in fertility 
by age of mother due solely to biological effects. This variable is 
based on children-ever-born to the wife, not children alive. 
The income variable used is the natural log of income of the husband. 
Income of the husband is preferred to total household income because 
hours and type of work of the husband (in cases where he heads the house­
hold) are less likely to be affected by the family's composition than 
those of the wife. In this way, any contribution children make to total 
~ 21 
income is also excluded. 
The relation of income to both household fertility and household 
educational investment is assumed to be nonlinear; for this reason the 
natural log of income is used in all regressions. The log form has the 
effect of imposing diminishin9 returns to higher income. In the invest­
ment regressions, the resulting semilog function implies that the income 
elasticity of educational spending declines toward zero, allowing for 
saturation. This is not a bad approximation over most levels of income, 
assuming parents perceive diminishing returns to educational expenditures 
per child. To produce human capital, education purchased in the market 
somust be combined for each child with innate ability and child time, 
that diminishing returns to market expenditures on per-child education 
are not unlikely. 
Education of husband and wife are continuous variables, i.e. years 
of schooling completed. Differences in type of education (e.g. post­
secondary vocational vs. university) are not distinguished. 
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The date includes informatio_~ on the m.nnber of years a family had 
resided in its city of residence at the time of the survey, up to five 
years, with families living in that city more than five years lumped 
together. For those who had arrived within the preceding five years, 
there is information on whether prior residence was one of the other of 
the four cities sampled, elsewhere in Colombia, or outside of Colombia. 
Families which had arrived in one of the four cities from elsewhere in 
Colombia within the five years preceding the survey are classified as 
migrants (MIGD). A second migrant variable, YSBC (years since in big 
city) is continuous, being between one and five, or for families in their 
current city more than five years, being valued as eight. Since the cities 
sampled are the four largest in the country, families coming from else­
where in Colombia would have come from rural areas or smaller cities. 
Dwmnies are used representing the household's current city of resi­
dence: Bogota, Cali or Medellin, with Barranquilla the ex.eluded city. 
Age of wife and the age of wife-schooling of wife interaction term, 
and their expected signs, are discussed with the regression results below. 
Unfortunately, there is no explicit information in this data set 
as to whether children in the households surveyed were actually enrolled 
in school at the time of the survey; what is known is the educational 
attainment of children. Thus it is impossible to do separate regressions 
predicting enrollment, and impossible to do regressions predicting educa­
tional spending conditional on enrollment. However, as mentioned above, 
a predictinn of expenditures by age-sex groups was constructed; using four 
different sets of criteria for what level of education should have been 
J 
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reached by what age, four sets of calculated guesses as to wh~ther children 
of specific ages were still enrolled were made (Appendix). Using the 
least demanding criteria of the four, about 25 percent of families with 
children between the ages of 6 and 22 have no children enrolled--many of 
these families may only have older children. This figure corresponds 
roughly to that of 20 percent of all families with children aged 6 to 
18 which reported zero spending on education. 
Table 3 is a matrix of simple correlations between the different 
educational investment variables and fertility-related yariables, for 
families with at least one child aged six ·to eighteen. Several variables 
not described above (and not used in the_ regression analysis) are included. 
ENRSC is a household enrollment score; using the least demanding age­
attainment standard, it is the ratio of apparently enrolled children to 
all children aged 6 to 22. CEB is children ever born. SPENDPC is spend­
ing per child aged 6 to 18. CH618 is number of children aged 6 to 18. 
Not surprisingly, total spending on education (TOTED) is positive­
ly correlated with the number of schoolage children, those aged 6 to 18. 
It is very slightly negatively correlated with children ever born and 
children alive. Spending per child is negatively correlated with all 
family size variables, and the age-standardized indices of investment 
per child (SC, EDI and ENRSC) are even more negatively correlated with 
these variables. 
A. Ordinary least-squares analysis 
Table 4 indicates the results of regressions of four different 
TABLE J 
Simple Correlations 
LYH CEB CHL ARAT CH618 TOTED SPENDPC BUDSHED EDI SC 
ENRSC 
LYH 1 -.19 -.10 -.21 .003 .59 .59 .28 . 37 
.55 -43 
-.16 -.23 -.2?CEB l .66 .84 .54 -.07 -.23 .009 
CHL l .57 .50 -.02 -.16 .05 
-.11 -.16 -- .19 
!RAT 1 .41 -.14 -.26 -.09 -.17
 -.21 -.19 
CH618 1 .r6 -.lJ .25 -.09 -.16 -.10 
1 • 82 .65 .JO .70 .JlTOTED 
1 .53 .41 .88 .J9SPENDPC 







N = 1433 




OLS Regressions of Investment Variable






variable: Total educational Budget share
 
score - SCspending to education index - EDI 
-1.13 -2.14
constant -364. -.052 
.J60 .·414.0167
Log of husband's 67.7 (23. 7)(11.J) (14. 3)income (LYH) (27.7) 
-28.5 'i -.01677 -.1.'.35-
, -.0623!
(2,2) I (1.07) , ( . 72) :( 2. 3) · 
\ ' .0928,




1; (1.7) ( .20) I! i I 
.712 .00123 .0122i 
.OJ93
CDJ 
( .09) ( •28) i• F = 2. 51 
( .16) IIF = 3. 3.d.75) !l F = 6. 98
· F = 1.58 8,1437
-2.17 ; 8,1437 --.00770:' 8,14
37 -.255 I 8,1437 -.182
ICD5 
·(.JO), c1. s> i c3. 43) l c3. 56 ) ;I 
CD6 2.94 .002021; 
-.07581 -.226 ! 





CD? 3.01 ( J. lJ)
(.J5) (.18) ( 2.43) 
- ..:n7 -.20817.4 .0130CDS ( 2. 52) ( 2.40)(1.42 (1.76) 
CD9 or more .785 .00525 
-.217 -.217 
( 2.18) {3.17)~_,l(.08) (.90) 
N =1447
N =1447 N =1447 N =1447
R =.15 R =.32R =.J6 . R =.09 
*CD = dummy for number of children alive, 
1 through 9 or more, 
with households with 4 children the excluded v
ariable. 
The t-statistic for each coefficient is in
 parentheses. 
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depend£,t variables, all indicators of parents' educational investments 
in children, on the income variable and a series of dummies representing 
families with from one to nine or more children, with four-child house­
holds the omitted variable. In column 1, the dependent variable is total 
educational spending. The signs of the coefficients on the dummies indi­
cate that, holding husband's income constant, total expenditures on 
education increase steadily up through four-child households, and then 
remain relatively constant. 
Our real interest, though, is the relationship between additional 
children and per-child, rather than total, spending. Table 5 shows the 
results of calculations of changes in per-child spending with addition-
22
al children based on the column (1) regression, Table 4. Figures 
1 and 2 indicate the shape of the relationship between number of children 
and both total spending and per-child spending. Additional children are 
clearly associated with declining per-child expenditures. 
The column (2), Table 4 regression has as the dependent variable 
the share of a household's total expenditures in the period going to 
education. The mean share for the sample is slightly over five percent. 
It is somewhat lower for families with one or two children, and then 
remains the same, regardless of how laLge the family becomes. The results 
are similar if dummies for only those children currently living at home 
are used (not shown). Thus families retain a certain proportion of spend­
ing on education, even as increasing family size makes othe~ demands on 
the budget; with a fixed proportion, per-child spending necessarily falls 
as family size increases. 
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TABLE 5 
Per-Child Educational Expenditures by ~ize or Family 
Per-child expenditures, based * 
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Number of ChilcirFl!nOlil"'ren
Total spending . Per.:.child spending 
80 40 








l 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Nl.!1'1ber ofNumber of 
childrenchildren 
•Amounts are equal to coefficient on LYH times menn LYH plus the 
(negative) constant, all divided by 4 for the 4-child family; for 
other family sizes, the coefficient on CD1 {i=l,2,J,5
,6,7,8,9 or more) 
is added, and the resulting figure divided by i•l,2,J,5,6,7,8,9. 
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In columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 are similar regressions, using the 
age-standardized dependent variables. A similar pattern is evident, as 
Parents to maintainillustrated in Figures 3, 4 and 5 on page 25. are able 
per-child educational investmen~ as family size increases up to three or 
four children; a significant drop in investment scores occurs with five or 
more children. 
The F-tests shown in Table 4 indicate that as a group the child 
durranies are significant at the 1 percent level in columns 2, 3 and 4, 
hut fall short of significance at 5 percent in column 1. 
The results of these regressions, however, must be interpreted 
with caution, as at most indicating how number of children and investment 
in children are correlated. On the one hand, we have not controlled 
for parents' education or migrant status. If less-educated or migrant 
parents have more children and spend less on education, the "cost of siblings" 
effect could be spurious. A more serious problem is the endogeneity of 
number of children. An investment equation is better estimated as part 
of a system representing the parents' simultaneous decisions regarding 
family size and investment, i.e., in linearized form: 
23 
N = a + a O + a SCW + a SCH + a LYH + ra.z. + £1
0 1 2 3 4 l li 
0 = B + B/! + s scw + s .scH + s LYH + rs .w. + £20 2 3 4 J Jj 
where N is the fertility variable, Q is the variable representing invest­
ment in education per child, SCW, SCH and LYH are the educational attain­
ment of the wife, educational attainment of the husband, and log of income 
of the husband, the Zi are variables which influence number of children but 
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FIGURES 3, 4 , 5 
Educational Investment Indices by Size of Family 
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not investment per child, and Wj are variables which influence investment 
per child, but not the number of children. An OLS estimate of the Q equa­
tion will result in parameter estimates which are biased, for two possible 
reasons. 
a. Assuming N and Qare substitutes, the coefficient on N will be 
negatively correlated with e: and thus biased downward. The shadow price
2 
of investment per child is lower for parents with fewer children. 
b. e: and e: may be correlated, though in what direction is not
1 2 
clear. We do not observe individual differences in fecundity nor in 
parental tastes. A preference for large numbers of children could be 
positively or negatively related to a preference for child-oriented 
patterns of expenditure. Positive correlation between e: and e:2 could1 
offset the negative bias of the number of children coefficient in equa­
tion (2); negative correlation, would increase further the bias. 
For these reasons, we turn to reduced-form and two-stage least 
squares estimates. 
B. Reduced-form estimates 
The two structural equations above are estimated as reduced-forms: 
= + y 12SCH y 15A
G\'/ +N ylO yll
sew + + ylJLYH + 'Y 14M + 
3 
AGS"1 + r y U. +yl6 . '' . ell . 1 1 . l1.= l 
J 
0 = + -,, scw + y 22SCH y 23LYH + y M + L Yi· + c21..,,20 21 + 24 i 1i=l 
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where Mis one of the two variables indicating the household's migration 
status, AGW and AGSW are age of wife and an age of wife-schooling of wife 
interaction term, and Ui are the city dummies (BOGD, CALD, MEDD). 
In interpreting the signs and overall magnitudes of the reduced-
form coefficients, it is important to take into account predictions from 
theory of their signs in the structural equations for N and Q. Even apart 
from direct estimation of the structural equations, we can use the theoreti­
cal predictions to improve interpretation of the reduced-form coefficients. 
For example, r r and r the reduced-form coefficients on mother's21 , 23 ,22 
and father's education and father's income, are equal to: 
=(Ba + B )/(1-S a )
1 2 2 1 1 
Looking, then, first at coefficient signs in the structural equations, 
the following comments can be made: 
Given the assumption that parents treat N and Q as substitutes, we 
expect a and s to be negative. a will be negative insofar as wife's1 1 2 
education represents the value of her time and the wife bears sufficient 
responsibility for care of children. The signs of a and e are not known
4 4 
a priori; additional income could increase either Nor Q or possibly both. 
A prevailing assumption is that the true income elasticity of Q is positive, 
so that the observed income elasticity, e
4 
, is likely to be positive, unless 
the true income elasticity of N is s~fficiently greater than that of Q. 
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Moreover, e
4 will be influenced positively if capital ""'larkets are imper­
fect, and parents with higher income are better able to finance invest­
ments in their children. The observed income elasticity of number of 
children (a
4
) is generally less likely to be positive; even if the true 
elasticity is positive, the interaction between N and Q will cause a down­
ward bias, and could make a
4 
negative. 
Insofar as we view Q, the dependent variable in the investment equa­
tion, as "quality" per child in the general sense of the wocd, and not 





, the coefficients on the education of parents, are not theoretically 
obvious. On the one hand, parents with more education are likely to have 
greater access to information on the returns to investment in schooling, 
an allocative effect of the parents' education, as well as to have great-
er taste for education in their children. On the other hand, as parents' 
education increases, the value of their own time increases concomitantly, 
so that if we include in Q parents' own time spent with children, at least 
the parent-time component of investment might decrease with parents' educa­
tion. Another twist, however: even as parent inputs measured in time-units 
might decrease with parents' education, if parents with more education are 
more efficient users of their own time with their children, parents' time 
measured in efficiency or value units might be constant or increase, even 
given a drop in actual time spent with children, as parents' education 
increases. Evidence from empirical studies indicates that parents with 
greater education do seem to invest more of their own time in their children. 
Interpretation of the evidence differs as to whether high-education parents 
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manage this primarily by having smalle~ families (thus increasing per­
child inputs of time even as total childrearing time is held constant or 
24
reduced), or by actually spending more hours in toto in childrearing. 
In this empirical analysis, the measure of investment per child is 
expenditures on schooling per child and children's schooling attainment. 
Since parents' time does not enter directly into schooling--in fact 
schooling may be a substitute for parents' time--8 and s will probably2 3 
be positive, either because of the taste effect or allocative effect of 
parents' education, or because parents substitute purchase of schooling 
for their own time in providing education to children. 
!urning then to expectations regarding the reduced-forms, note that 
with B and a both negative it is clear that in the reduced-form invest­1 1 
ment equation, the coefficient on mother's education must be greater than 
the structural effect of mother's education on child investment. In con­
trast, if a (the coefficient of father's education on N) is close to3 
zero, as is a common assumption, i.e. that the price of father's time 
does not affect demand for children, then the reduced-form coefficient 
on father's education is, relative to that on mother's education, closer 
to representing the true structural effect of father's education on invest­
ment in children. Such a contrast may explain the not uncommon finding 
that mother's education affects child quality more than father's education, 
a result usually attributed to the presumed greater amount of time mothers 
spend with children. Similarly, if the structural effect of income is 
positive (a >0) in the demand for children equation, it will bias down­4 
ward the coefficient on income in the reduced-form investment equation. 
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1. Fertility results 
Table 6 shows the results of reduced-form estimation of the fertili­
ty equation, with the number of children alive the dependent variable in 
columns 1 and 2, and ARAT the dependent variable in columns 3 and 4. 
The coefficient of age of wife in the children alive equation (col­
umns 1 and 2) is positive as expected, reflecting the longer exposure to 
the risk of pregnancy, and possibly some cohort effect--that older women 
have higher fertility even on an age-specific basis (which is likely 
since the fertility rate in Colombia has been declining). In the ARAT 
regressions, where the biological factor of increased exposure to pregnancy 
is controlled for, any cohort effect is apparently swamped by a strong 
life-cycle effect, i.e. relative to the possibilities of childbearing, 
Colombian women restrict fertility significantly in the latter part of 
their childbearing years. 
Education of the wife and husband both depress fertility. In all 
cases the magnitude of the coefficient on wife's education is greater; 
since the wife usually is the partner primarily responsible for child­
rearing in Colombia, this result is consistent with the theory that 
fertility is influenced by parents' price of time. Education may also 
represent a lower information cost of using contraceptives effectively. 
Income of the husband has a statistically significant positive 
effect on children alive; its sign is positive but not significant in 
the ARAT regressions. (The A.RAT measure is based on children-ever-born; 
income might affect it less if the principal effect of higher income is 
to suppress infant and child mortality.) The income results indicate 
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TABLE 6 
Reduced-Form Fertility Regressions 
(n = 2346) 
Col. J Col. 4Col. 1 Col. 2
Explanatory dependent variable: dependent variabl
e: 
Variables childf~n~ Alive ARAT 
CONSTANT 2.42 1.23 0.816 0.669 
(12. 7) (11.5)(3.85) ( 2. 27) 
-0.0188 -0.0187-0.176 -0.179~w 
(-J. 74) (-J. 82) (-J.90) (-J. 92
) 
-0.012 -0.0120SOi -0.111 -0.109 (-6.22)(-5.81) (-5.77) (-6.25) 
0.335 0.0165 0.0162LYH 0.338
( J. 8J) ( J. 81) (1.83) (1. 82) 
AGW 0.056 0.054 -0.00209 
-0.00228 
( 6.69) (9.49) (-2.46) (-2
.70) 
AG.C,W 0.00258 0.0026J 0.00019
2 0.00185 





MIGD 0.85J ( 5.24)( J. 92) 
-0.01370.248BOJD (-0. 78)(1.43) 
-0.064-0. 340CALD (-J.42)(-l.84) 
0.06150.606MEDD (J.40)( J.40) 
The t-statistic for each coefficient is 
in parentheses. 
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a notable income effect on quantity of children, once parents' education, 
representing price-of-time, is controlled. 25 This indicates that during 
this period in Colombia, the income elasticity of quantity of children 
was not necessarily less (or if less, not substantially less) than the 
income elasticity of quality of children. Thus reductions in familv size 
must be due directly to the price effect of increasing value of parents' 
time, rather than to upward shifts in the taste for quality in children. 
This is consistent with the structural estimation result (discussed below) 
showing a direct causal link from lower fertility to greater per-child 
investment. The similarly positive effect of income on per-child invest­
ment (Table 7) demonstrates that the income effect can be simultaneously 
positive on both quantity and quality in children. 
The age of wife-schooling of wife interaction term is positive 
and statistically significant in the children alive regression. This is 
somewhat surprising, since we might expect the positive effect cf age to 
be attenua·ted, rather than increased, by increased schooling (if for 
example the more-educated of the older women had been better able to pro-
cess new information regarding contraceptives in the early 1960s). There 
are two possible reasons: one is a timing effect; more-educated women 
delay childbearing, but then space births closely so as to concentrate 
the period of childbearing; thus at somewhat earlier ages they may have 
what is temporarily higher fertility than their less-schooled contemporaries. 
A second possibility is that for ·those older women with more ·education, 
infant mortality was not as high as for their contemporaries; this is 
consistent with the fact that the interaction term is less positive 
-33-
and not significant (at the 5 percent level) in the ARAT regression, 
ARAT being based on children-ever-born rather than children currently alive. 
2. Investment results 
The per-child educational investment regressions are shown in 
Table 7 for the two dependent variables described above: SC (family's 
score relative to other families in terms of current spending on educa­
tion, standardized for expected expenditure given the age and sex of their 
children) and EDI (family's educational index, based on children's educa­
tional attainment compared to others in their age-sex group). A comparison 
of the effect of the independent variables on number-of-children and on 
investment-per-child is instructive. Education of parents has the expect­
ed opposite effects, reducing fertility and increasing investment. As 
noted above, the direct effect of the mother's education on investment, 
will be overestimated in the reduced-form if, as seems the case, her 
education reduces fertility. On the other hand, income has a strong 
positive effect on both N and Q; thus its direct effect on one or both 
is underestimated in these reduced-forms. 
YSBC (years since the household arrived in one of the four big cities) 
and MIGD (migrant dummy) are a continuous and discrete version of the 
same variable (with the expected signs reversed), and by definition should 
have opposite effects in the fertility and investment regressions. As 
expected, recent migrants have higher fertility and lower investment 
than longer-term residents, though again from the reduced-forms we can-
not tell to what extent the fertility behavior influences investment behavior, 
TABLE 7 
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1For families with a child between 6 and 18 years, using score #4, 
as derived in the Appendix. 
2ror families with a child between 6 and 18 years. 
The t-statistic for each coefficient is in parentheses. 
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and vice versa. Interestingly, the effect of migrant status on current 
expenditures (Table 7, columns 1 and 2) is not statistically significant 
at the five percent level, though the effect on their children's overall 
educational attainment is. This is as we might expect: the latter depend­
ent variable reflects a series of past decisions regarding schooling, 
many made presumably in the rural environment. The current spending 
variable better reflects the migrant households' current urban environ­
ment, indicating migrant households act like other households in terms of 
their current spending, so that there must be a rapid catch-up effect 
operating on their children's educational achievement. 26 
The city dummies (Bogota, Cali, Medellin, with Barranquilla the 
omitted category) generally have contrary effects as would be expected, 
on the two dependent variables, though not always, indicating there are 
price differences either for schooling (e.g. tuition fees) or births 
(e.g. contraceptive costs) across the cities which attenuate the simple 
negative correlation between N and Q. Medellin is clearly a high-fertili­
ty low-investment city relative to Bogota and Barranquilla. Cali exhibits 
lower fertility but lower investment (the latter not at statistically 
significant levels) as well. The Medellin result may reflect greater 
continuing attachment to surrounding rural regions in Medellin, which 
is the major city in the smallholding coffee region of Colombia 27; in 
any event more investigation of these clear effects of differing economic 
or social environments is warranted. In these reduced-forms, it is not 
possible to isolate whether, for example, Medellin residents have com­
paratively high-fertility and low per-child investment because high 
fertility causes low investment, low investment causes high fertility, 
or both are caused by other factors. 
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C. Two-stage least squares estimates 
Finally, I present two-stage least squares estimates of the invest­
ment equation suggested by the jointly-determined model: 
N = a + a o + a SCW + a
3










4LYH + ta.W. + t 2j J J 
These estimates of the Q equation above, in contrast to the ordinary least 
squares estimates in section A, have the statistical property of consist­
ency, since the fertility variable, N, is treated as endogenous. 
Unfortunately, estimation of this system is by no means straight­
forward, because of the difficulty of identifying the two equations. It 
is the Zi and Wj, i.e. those v~riables representing respectively factors 
which influence number of children but not investment per child, and vice 
versa, which would permit identification of the equations. The fertility 
equation is virtually impossible to identify in any data set; an identi­
fying variable would be some proxy for the fixed costs of quality in 
children, i.e. a cost unassociated with number of children. (If parents 
were not allowed to move, an exogenous increase in, for example, the pro­
perty tax which f\lllded local schooling, would qualify, since all households 
pay the tax, regardless of number of children. 28) Thus the structural fer-
tility equation is not estimated at all. The ideal identifying variable 
for the investment equation is the cost of contraceptives; lower contra­
ceptive costs cause a relative increase in the fixed cost of child nuni>ers 
at a given rate of sexual intercourse. The investment equation is identified 
in two ways. _One is the use of a schooling age-of-wife interaction term 
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in the fertility equation; this term probably reflects differences in 
timing of births due to differing price of time constraints for women 
by education. Timing of births will not affect educational investment 
(independent of income and other parent characteristics). Secondly, the 
two variables representing whether parents recently migrated to one of· 
the four large cities are entered into the fertility equation, on the 
grounds that the cost of obtaining and using generally less-accessible 
contraceptives was less in these cities than elsewhere in Colombia. In­
sofar as this could also be true for obtaining education for children, 
the assumption that these migration-related variables affect fertility 
but not educational investment is a weak one. However, it is more justi­
fiably excluded from that investment equation where the dependent variable 
is current spending, than from that equation where the dependent variable 
reflects to a greater extent past investment, i.e. where it is educational 
attainment to date of children. Thus two-stage least squares is used only 
to estimate the investment equation in which the dependent variable is 
cur~ent spending. 
In Table 8 are the results from estimating this structural investment 
equation in which the dependent variable is the household's "score" rela­
tive to other households in the sample on current spending on education, 
standardized for each household in terms of the ages and sexes of children 
aged 6 to 22 (columns 1 to 3) and 6 to 18 (columns 4 to 6). The column 1 
regression, using children alive, indicates a clear negative effect of 
number of children on per-child spending, as predicted. The coefficient 
of the alternative fertility measure, ARAT, is not statistically significant 
(and is of the wrong sign) in column 2, probably reflecting the difficulty 
TABLE 8 
Regressions on Household Educational Expenditure Scores 
Col. 4 Col. 5 Col. 6Col. 3Col. 1 Col. 2 
(2SLS) ( 2SLS) .. (ir1'Strumental (2SLS) (2SLS) (instrumental 
:llai::I ah l e es timat.e.L.- variables estimate)
Explantory Households with at least one Households with at least one child aged
Variables child aged 6 to 22 6 to 18, and none aged 19 to 22. 
(n rz 1559) (n = 1255) 
CONSTANT -1.395 -2.02 -1. 273 -1.483 -2.019 -1.187 
(-7. 79) (-7.91) (-4 .11) (-5.99) (-7. 50) (-3.33) 
sew 0.0254 0.034 0.0244 0 .0310 0 .0375 0.0259 
(4. 26) (6 .02) (3.52) (4.60) (6.04). (3.28) 
SCH 0.00997 0.025 0 .0134 0.0138 0.0213 0.00996 
(1.58} · (3. 92) (2.10) (2.10) ( 3. 41) (1.36) 
LYH o. 303 0.280 o. 277 0.295 0. 295 0.287 
· (12.4) (12.5) (12. 7) (11. 3) (11.1) (11.4) 
I 
00CHL* -0.075 -- -- -0.0585 -- --
l.,J 
I 
(-2. 70) (-1. 54) 
ARAT* 0.357 -- -- 0.261 
(1. 26) (.960) 
ARAT** -0.676 -0.874 
(-1.63) (-1.85) 
2
R • .34 R2 • .34 
The t-statistic for each coefficient is in parentheses. 
* Endogenous variables in two-stage least squares estimation. See text. 
**Endogenous variables, predicted using larger sample. See text. 
of identifying the investment equation and the sensitivity of estimates 
to the identification procedure. The regression in column 3 is based on 
use of an instrumental variable, predicted ARAT, estimated using the sample 
of all households, including those with no schoolage children and those 
with no children at all. Such use of an instrumental variable based on 
a prediction from a different sample (columns 3 and 6) produces estimates 
which are inconsistent in the statistical sense; on the other hand, the 
endogenous fertility variables in columns 1, 2, 4 and 5, from the sample 
including only households with schoolage children, are .derived from the 
first stage of a two-stage estimation technique which contains sample bias 
(however, this does not make the structural estimates of Table 8 inconsistent). 
At any rate, probably because predicted ARAT from the full sample takes 
account of the additional information regarding demand for fertility, it 
is of the expected negative sign and close to significance in the column 3 
equation. 
The same regressions are shown for the smaller sample of households 
with children 6 to 18 years old, and none older. The coefficients on 
children alive in column 4 and on the predicted fertility variable in 
column 6 are not statistically significant at the 5 percent level, but 
are of the same sign as in the columns 1 and 3 regressions. 
The positive effect of income is only slightly greater in this 
structural equation than in the reduced-form investment equation. Inso­
far as the true structural effect is well-reflected in the investment 
reduced-form, we can assume its true effect is underestimated in the 
fertility reduced-form, .again pointing to a positive income elasticity 
for numbers of children. 
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In these regressions, in contrast to the reduced forms, the .~ffect 
of parents' education on investment can be interpreted as structural, 
purged of additional positive effects education may have on Q through 
its negative effect on N. The coefficient on wife's education continues 
to be greater than that on husband's, contradicting the expectation that 
its greater magnitude in the reduced form reflected primarily its theoreti­
cally stronger negative effect on N. However, husband's education is high­
ly correlated with his income, dictating caution in comparing coefficients 
on husband's and wife's education. 
The results confirm a causal .effect of number of children on .invest­
ment per child. Since the dependent variable is a score relative to 
other households, and since relative shifts in the score will vary for 
children at different ages, it is difficult to specify the negative effect 
of siblings in terms of years of schooling lost. However, based on the 
coefficient of the log of income (.303) and of children alive (-0.075), 
evaluated at the means of the variables an increase of one in the 
number of children causes a 20 percent reduction in the family's score; 
to offset that reduction would require about a 30 percent increase in 
husband's income, from 614 (the antilog of the mean log of income) to 
29
804 pesos quarterly. This result points to a not inconsiderable 
"cost of siblings." The result is consistent with the model linking 
quality and quantity, and despite identification problems, indicates 
clearly that large family size causes a reduction in parental investment 
per child. To the extent that large families are more prevalent among 
poor families with less-educated parents, lower per-child investments by 
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such families may perpetuate poverty i~om one generation to the next. 
On the other hand, exogenous changes in prices parents face which would 
reduce fertility, would lead to concomitant increases in investment; 




CHILDREN AND RE.cmLTS OF REGREt;SlONSDESIGNATION OF "ENROLLED 11 
OF HOUSEHOID EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITIJRES ON ENROLLFD 
CHILDREN BY AGE AND f>EX 
Four different age standards for educational att~inment were attempted, 
as outlined. in the following table: 
Definitely Probably More definitely Less probably
enrolledenrolled enrolled enrolled 
OT education 
>-
6knows alphabet 6 6 
1 7 7-P. 6-7 7-8 
8. 92 8 9
10 9 103 9
4 10 11-1,2 10 11 
6 11-12 lJ 11 12 
7 lJ 14 12 13 
8 14 15 13 14 
9 15 16 14. 15 
17 1610 16 15 
11 17 18 16 17 
12 18 19 17 18
1913 19 20 18 
2014. 20 21 19 2115 21 22 20 




The resulting predicted costs by age-sex category are based on the 
equation: 
where E ECDx is a series of age-sex dummies for enrolled children, with6 
9 year old boys the excluded category. 
The following matrices show predicted expenditures for each age-sex 
category, based on the constant plus coefficients from the regressions 
for definitely, probably and less probably enrolled (the more definitely 
enrolled category appeared too stringent, based on the number of cases), 
with the constant entered for nine-year old boys. The number of households 
with an enrolled child by each standard is also indicated. An asterisk in 
a box indicates that the corresponding coefficient was statistically signi­
ficant at the 5 percent level. 
J 
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Definitely enrolled· ; number of children apparently enrolled by this definition is 1161. 
Age 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 lJ 14 i5 16 17 18 19 20 
21 22 
Sex 
80* 145* 164* 253* 75 203* 1151 102*B 24 34 56 26 91* 94* 45 107* 109* 
G 27 62• 76* 107* 761 120* 53 73* 981 65* 174
1 llJ* 134* 112* 78* 82 2001 
Probably enrolled ; number of children apparently enrolled by this definition is 1409. 
Age 6 ? 8 9 10 11 12 lJ 14 15 16 17 18 19 
20 21 22 
Sex 
85* 116* 191* 68 215* 92* 113*B 26 J3 19 19 54* 79* J6 82* 58* 50 
16 52* 46* 43 59* 78* Jl 47* 75* 58* 124* 84* 128* 
90* BJ* 56 206*
0 
Less probably enrolled·.; number of children apparently enrolled by this defintion is 1316.• 
Age 226 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21Sex 
B 23 JJ 27 22 58* 80* 40 -104* 91* 77* 139* 162* 259* 65 200* 106
1 106* 




Based·on these J sets of scores, 4 sets of predicted expenditures 
by age-sex category were used to obtain the denominator of 4 different 
SCs. These 4 sets, shown below, are a smoothed version of the 3 above, 
and a 4th smoothed version of the first 3. Regression results never 
differed significantly among the 4 scores. 
Age 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 lJ 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Sex 
B 40 40 40 40 70 70 70 90 90 90 150 150 200 125 125 125 125 
. G 50 50 50 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 140 140 140 100 100 100 100 
Age 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 lJ 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Sex 
B 25 25 25 25 60 60 60 60 60 60 90 90 150 150 150 100 100 
G 40 40 40 40 55 55 55 55 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 100 100 
Age 
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 lJ 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22Sex 
B 25 · 25 25 25 70 70 70 90 90 90 90 150 150 150 150 150 150 
G 50 50 50 50 70 70 70 70 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 
¼,e 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 lJ 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Sex 
B 35 35 35 35 ?O 70 70 80 80 80 lJO lJO 150 lJO lJO lJO lJO 
G 50 50 50 50 70 70 70 70 80 80 120 120 120 120 100 110 110 
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FOOTNOTES 
1niough this problem is not the concern of this paper, underinvest­
ment may be caused simply because of an intergenerational externality, 
apart from the presence or absence of siblings. Though the family is 
posited as an institution which minimizes such underinvestment, parents 
may stop short of a socially optimal level of investment in children. 
The child might be willing to compensate parents to invest directly in 
him or her, but the parents would have no certainty that the child would 
repay them, and the child cannot borrow easily. Lazear (1975) develops 
a model showing the likelihood of such an externality; he points out 
that parents may also underinvest in their own human capital if they 
fail to take into account the returns to their children from their own 
increased capital. 
2zajonc (1976), Terhune (1974), Wray (1971), Lindert (1978, Ch. 6). 
Number of siblings has also been linked to adults' occupational status 
(Lindert 1978) and earnings (Bowles 1972). Simon and Pilarski (forth­
coming), using a cross-section of countries, find only a very weak negative 
relation between the proportion of children in national populations and per­
child government spending on education, controlling for per-capital income. 
Such a finding using aggregate data is not inconsistent with reductions 
in households' private spending on per-child education as number of children 
increases. 
3This data set, collected by the Center for the Study of Economic 
Development (CEDE), Universidad de los Andes, Bogota, i.s described in 
Prieto (1977) and Musgrove (1978, forthcoming). 
4Such analyses of the Colombia data include Prieto (1977), Musgrove 
(1978), and Rodriguez and Gomez (1977). Brown and Deaton (1972) provide 
a review of the literature on consumer budget analysis. Prais and Houthakker 
(1955) deal specifically with family composition and economies of scale 
effects, developing and testing various computational techniques. See 
also Sydenstricker and King (1921) and Friedman (1952). 
5In a recent discussion of expenditure analyses, Muellbauer (1977) 
alludes to the fact that, though children constrain current household 
consumption, over the parents' lifetime they more properly enter the 
utility function, so that family size and composition are endogenous 
(p. 461). 
61eibenstein (1975), Duesenberry (1960), Caldwell (1976). Easterlin, 
with his "relative income" and "relative status" arguments (1973), attri­
butes allocation of resources by parents between themselves and children 
to the parents' own childhood experience, which he suggests influences 
their aspirations for a certain standard of living for themselves and for 
spending on the quality of their children. 
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An example of the logical error of assuming a direct causal link
between family size and child well-being is the following: Studies of
children's consumption and work contribution in certain rural societies
suggest that under some circumstances children involve negative costs,
or positive value, to parents, at given rates of discount, time preference,
etc. (Cain 1977, White 1973; Mueller (1976) comes to the opposite conclu­
sion.) If we find that these children from large families who work on
their parents' small family farms receive less schooling than their urban
counterparts, should we conclude they receive less schooling because
they have many siblings? Clearly not--more likely they both have many
siblings and receive limited schooling because of the economic setting
in which they are raised. This is the implication of an analysis of
fertility, schooling and children's work contribution in India, by
Rosenzweig and £venson (1977). 
7Analysis of the 1973 census indicates a rapid deGline in Colombian
fertility, beginning in the mid-sixties. Fertility differentials by
residence (urban-rural) and education have been and continue to be con­
siderable. However, the composition of the population by residence and
education has changed considerably. See Potter, Ordonez and Measham (1976). 
8
Willis (19 73), Becker and Lewis (19 73). See also De Tray (1973).
Becker's 1965 article on the theory of time allocation fathered what
has come to be called the "new home economics" approach to studying the
effect of economic factors on fertility. 
9There is thus an important distinction between high-wage house-
holds in which all income is earned through labor, and high-income
households where much or all income is from capital. In the latter
households, increased income should be associated unequivocally with
increased demand for child services, since there is no additional cost
of spending more time with children when additional income is not asso­
ciated with working time of parents (assuming the wife works). 
lOThis follows immediately from the first-order conditions for
maximizing the utility function subject to the budget constraint,
I= NQnC + Z1r2 . With the assumption of same quality of each child in 
the household, the first-order conditions include: MU = AOn ·N - C'
MUQ =ANTIC; MU2 = A11" 2
• Becker and Lewis, in discussing price effects, 
generalize the budget constraint so that the shadow prices for N and Q
each contain a "fixed" component: I= NQ1rc ~·N1rN + Q1rQ + Z1r2 • The 
shadow prices are then: PN = Q1rc + 1rN; PQ: Nnc + n
0
; P2 = 1r2 . It 
is the fixed components which in principle make it possible to identi­
fy price effects on consumption of N and Q. 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1978) have shown that it is not possible to
distinguish empirically between this model with interaction between 
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Q and N, and a simple fixed price model without interaction, withoutsome restrictions on the characteristics of the utility function. Theyuse the random occurrence of multiple births to represent variation inthe fixed price of Nin a cross-section of households; then with therestriction that both Q and Z are substitutes for N, they can test theinteractive model. It is accepted, given that restriction and given cer­tain bounds on the cross-price elasticity between PN and Q. 
11
The proportion of persons aged 12 to 19 enrolled in ·school was5 percent in 1951, 12 percent in 1964, and 24 percent in 1973; despiterapid increases in the size of this population the rate of increase inproportions enrolled was higher in the late sixties than in the fifties.Between 1950 and 1958, spending at all levels of government on educationwas about 22 percent of total spending; between 1958 and 1967, the propor­tion spent on education rose to about 45 percent. (DANE, 1975, p. 110and 1971, p. 128). 
12Lindert, 1978, p. 195, finds using U.S. data, that family sizeis a more important determinant of predicted inputs into each childthan are birth order and spacing. 
13Birdsall (1978). 
14Sample sizes also differ somewhat because of missing data onsome variables; only male-heade
1
d households are included in the reduced­form and two-stage least squares estimates; for certain investment regres­sions, families with any children aged 19 to 22 were excluded, as suchchildren could affect the 6 to 18 year old based scores. 
15We have no simple way to measure the quality of education, anduse the strong assumption throughout that price differences in schoolingreflect quality differences, i.e. parents who pay more get more. 
16Parameter estimates from regressions using the score calculatedfor children up to 22 do not differ significantly in the reduced-formregressions, and are not reported. They are reported below in the onecase where they are different, using two-stage least squares. 
17The expenditure score variable captures to some extent the oppor­tunity cost to parents of keeping their children in school and foregoingtheir home or labor market contribution to the household. However, inthis dependent variable, these opportunity costs are combined with directcosts. The two-stage least squares estimation might therefore overstatethe(negative) effect of increasing family size if parents with morechildren tend to substitute their own time for market expenditures inproducing their children's human capital. Since education-at-home ispossible with greater economies of sc.ale than education-at-school, this 
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is theoretically plausible. On the other hand, analy.-es of U.S. time 
budget data have indicated that parents (generally of lower income) do not 
increase overall time spent with children as number of children increases, 
and thus do decrease time per child (even assuming some economies of 
scale in time inputs to children). (Leibowitz 1974, Lindert 1978, Appen­
dix C). Parents thus seem to treat time and goods as complements in the 
production of child human capital. Furthermore it is likely that the 
goods-intensive nature of children increases as children grow older so 
that for school-age children, differences in money expenditures by family 
size reflect fairly well differences in total parental investment, both 
time and goods, in children. Gronau (1977) su~gests children are not 
always home-time intensive: "Thus, while in the range where children's 
goods are produced at home, an increase in wage increases the price of 
children, when these goods are replaced by market goods, the increase 
in wage reduces it ... The goods-intensive nature of children becomes 
more explicit as the child grows older . " (pp. 30-31) 
18Rosenzweig (1977) uses this index for Indian data. 
19 For parents to replace children who die requires that the demand 
for surviving children be price inelastic; that it is inelastic is indicated where 
evidence shows a positive association between child mortality and fer-
tility. See Schultz (19 76). 
20Boulier and Rosenzweig ·(1978) suggest a measure of fertility which 
is standardized for the age-fecundity relationship using an age-specific 
natural fertility schedule and for exposure to the risk of conception 
associated with marriage duration ("DRAT"). The measure used here, 
"ARAT," is not standardized for marriage duration, since age at marriage 
itself is endogenous in terms of the household decisionmaking process 
being analyzed, e.g. better-educated women may choose to marry later. 
21The correlation between husband's income and total household income 
is •95. 
22spend'ing and i ncome amounts are not annual, b ut quarter1y. 
23strictly speaking, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which 
the coefficient on Nin the Q equation could be interpreted as a response 
of parents to an exogenous change in N, multiple births beinf a possible 
exception (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1978). But this system, with N endogenous, 
provides a consistent estimate of the "effect" of a change in the "price" of 
N, on Q. 
24 
Lindert (1974) interprets results of his U.S. data analysis as 
indicating that higher-income, higher-status wives do not spend more 
time in child care than lower-status counterparts. They do tend to spend 
more time per child by having fewer children (pp. 67-69). There is no 
evidence that higher-status mothers spend in toto less time, however. 
Leibowitz (1974) finds more-educated mothers to be more efficient in 
production at home of children's human capital. 
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25Since education and income of husband are highly correlated 
positively (.64), the positive income effect may reflect unexpected
income, or income over what a family anticipates, given the husband's 
educ~tion. This result is consistent with Easterlin's relative income 
hypothesis (Easterlin 1973) and with positive effects on fertility of 
upswings in the business cycle in developed country time-series (Lindert
19 78). 
The positive correlation between husband's education and income 
does suggest caution in comparing the coefficients of husband's and 
wife's education. 
26Expenditure data were collected at four different times of the 
year; regressions with dummy variables included fo~ the period when a 
household was surveyed indicated spending on education varied systemati­
cally by period because of the schooling cycle. However, coefficients 
on variables of interest were not different from those in Table 7. 
Migrant families were equally represented in the different periods. 
For discussion of the hypothesis that migrants achieve earnings
similar to longtime residents within 5 to 10 years, see Yap (1976). 
27walton (1977) states in describing early 20th century Medellin: 
"The fervently Catholic labor force was not secularized by these trends 
toward modernization. Traditionally conservative beliefs persisted • • • " 
(p. 71). Medellin is the industrial center of a region, Antioquia, which 
has a reputation for independence and regional identity. It has not 
been a center for in-migrants from other regions, as Cali and Bogota
have been. Musgrove (personal correspondence) suggests Medellin has 
higher overall fertility because of a more highly-skewed distribution 
of income, with more families characterized by low income and high
fertility. 
28
such an increase in the fixed cost of child quality would lower 
the relative price of child numbers, given they are substitutes, and 
lead to an increase in number of children. 
29 
Dividin~ the coefficient on CHL (.075) by .4 (the mean investment 
score for this sample)• .19, or about a 20 percent reduction in the 
score with one additional child. To obtain the compensating 20 percent
increase in the score, we use .3, the coefficient on income: 
• 3( X) = .20 :). X = .27.4 
6 42The mean log of income is 6.42, and e · = 614. 6.42(1.27) = 6.69, and 
6 69e · = 804. 
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